Reactions from the American press toward the regime of Salvador Allende by Heal, Charles Frederick & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
The University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro 
JACKSON LIBRARY 
^-•^x    ...CQ... 
J|) ...kxx.ul3..Z.o. 
UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES 
HEAL, CHARLES FREDERICK. Reactions from the American Press 
Toward the Regime of Salvador Allende.  (1974) 
Directed byt  Dr. Franklin D. Parker. Pp. 75. 
In September, 1970, a Marxist, Salvador Allende was 
elected President of Chile. It was the purpose of this 
thesis to review the treatment of the Allende regime by 
the American press. Because so much had been written about 
Allende and his government, this paper discussed three key 
events during his administration;  the election of Allende, 
Allende*s policies of nationalization, and the overthrow 
of the Allende government. This thesis did not attempt to 
be a study of Salvador Allende, nor was it a study of his 
government. Omitted from this paper were the activities 
of various terrorist groups, congressional and municipal 
elections and the ITT scandal and its related consequences. 
In a study such as this, it would have been practically 
impossible to reflect the opinion of every newspaper and 
news magazine in the United States. As a result, selections 
from only the following newspapers were examinedi  the 
Washington Post. New York Times. Denver Post, and Chicago 
Tribune. These newspapers were chosen because they repre- 
sented a. wide geographical area, and because they commented 
frequently on the Chilean situation. In addition, several 
news magazines were thoroughly examined. Included among 
these were U. S. News flprt Wnrld Report. lime, Newsweeft, 
and The Nation. These were the only American news magazines 
which gave a continual account of the events in Chile. 
Other news magazines researched which published occasional 
articles on the Chilean situation were Reader's Digest. 
The New Republic. Commonweal, and Business Week. 
It can be said that the American press reacted both 
favorably and unfavorably to the events in Chile. News 
publications such as the magazines Time. The Nation. Newsweek, 
and the newspapers New York Times. Washington Post. Denver 
Post, were generally sympathetic to the Allende government. 
Conversely, the U. S. News and World Report magazine and 
the Chicago Tribune newspaper were both consistently criti- 
cal of Allende and his administration. It was observed that 
the news sources which published infrequent articles on 
the Chilean situation generally gave factual accounts as 
opposed to sympathetic or critical accounts of Allende*s 
government. 
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
Salvador Allende Gossens was born July 26,   1908, in 
Valparaiso,  Chile.    Allende*s father,   a wealthy lawyer, died 
when Allende was still in his teens.    Several years later 
Allende enrolled as a medical student at the University of 
Chile.     It was during these years at the University that 
Allende became interested in politics.    While there he was 
elected Vice-President of the student federation and was 
jailed twice for political reasons. 
The   1930*s held several significant events for Sal- 
vador Allende.    In 1932,  Allende earned his medical degree. 
One year later Allende founded the Chilean Socialist Party. 
In 1937»  he was elected to the lower house of Congress.    Dr. 
Allende was  named to head the government's relief program 
when a major earthquake killed 10,000 Chileans in 1939-    As 
a result of his work in this crisis, Allende  received na- 
tional acclaim.    Shortly after this Chilean disaster Allende 
published a book entitled Socio-Medical Problems of Chile. 
The book attacked capitalism in Chile,  saying that it created 
1 
the health problems of the poor. 
-Allende,   a Man of the Privileged Class Turned 
Radical Politician,"    New York Times     (September 12,   1973). 
p.   18. 
During the early forties, Allende*s interest in pol- 
itics continued.  In 19^5# Allende was elected to the Chilean 
Senate.  By 1952, Allende had decided to run for President. 
In the election, however, Allende received only 6# of the 
vote.  In 1958 and 196^, he ran again for President increasing 
his margins in both elections.  Finally, in September, 1970, 
the people of Chile elected Marxist Salvador Allende as their 
President.  Allende thus became the first Marxist democrat- 
ically elected to serve as President of a country in the West- 
ern Hemisphere.  Once in office, Allende experienced many 
difficulties.  His country was besieged with economic and 
political problems.  After three years of struggling unsuc- 
cessfully with these problems, the Allende government was 
overthrown by a military coup. 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the treatment 
of the Allende regime by the American press. Reports on 
Allende and on his government appeared frequently in the Amer- 
ican press.  This paper, however, does not attempt to review 
all of these press releases but instead will discuss only 
some of the key events during his administration.  The second 
chapter will focus on the reaction of the American press to 
Allende*s victories — first at the polls in September. 1970, 
and then in the Congress two months later.  The third chap- 
ter will deal with the treatment by the American press of 
Allende•■ policies of nationalization and will review the 
United States' news reaction to the continuing decline in 
Chile's economy. The closing chapter will review the re- 
sponse of various United States publications to the over- 
throw of the Allende government. 
Several American news sources were selected to com- 
plete  this study.     The criteria used in the selection pro- 
cess  were«     l)   the  frequency with which  the  publication 
commented on the Chilean situation    2)   the geographic area 
represented by the particular publication    3)   the avail- 
ability of the particular source.     It was observed that 
the Washington Post. New York Times.  Denver Post and Chicago 
Tribune satisfied all three requirements.    In addition, 
news  magazines  such  as  U.  S.   News  and  World  Report.  Time. 
Newsweek.  Business Week,  and The Nation were also used 
primarily because of their week-by-week accounts of the 
events  in Chile.     Additional news magazines which provided 
some  information included  Reader's  Digest.  The  New Republic 
and  Commonweal. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ELECTION OF ALLENDE 
In the Chilean presidential election of September, 
1970, three candidates ran for office.  The incumbent, 
President Eduardo Prei, having just completed a six year 
term, was ineligible to run. Dr. Frei's Christian Demo- 
cratic Party therefore nominated Radomiro Tomic Tomero 
as their candidate. Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, as 
avowed Marxist, was a second candidate and the third can- 
didate was conservative Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez. 
The results of the election, however, were such that 
no one candidate received a majority. Allende won with a 
plurality receiving l,0?5,6l6 votes, while Alessandri fin- 
ished second with 1,036,278 votes, and Tomic was third with 
824,849 votes. The Allende victory resulted in an immediate 
response from most major news sources in the United States. 
Some of these sources expressed alarm at the new Marxist 
government.  A Naw York Times editorial, for example, called 
the Allende victory, "... a heavy blow at liberal democ- 
2 
racy."  In another editorial, this same newspaper commented 
that how Chile handles the rough road ahead "... will 
-Election of Allende,"  N«w York Times  (Septem- 
ber 6, 1970), p. 10. 
5 
inevitably affect the chance for the survival of freedom 
3 
and democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere — and beyond*" 
The editors of the Chfrcayn Tribune, however, did not appear 
to take the results as seriously as the New York Times 
and did not forsee Marxism becoming a way of life in Chile. 
The editors of the Chicago Tribune wrote, "If a western 
country has to go Marxist voluntarily, there could be 
worse countries than Chile and worse Marxists than Dr. 
Allende. Chile is a relatively prosperous and educated 
country in which Marxism may prove more of a political 
k 
fad than an economic conviction."  Their editorial con- 
cluded i 
If Dr. Allende succeeds in turning 
Chile into a classic Marxist economic 
state, without curtailing political 
and social freedom in the processt 
and if Chile later votes to remain 
Marxist in a free election, then -- 
well, we'll eat our sombrero. 5 
The editors of The Nation magazine took yet another 
view of Allende's election. They seemed to defend the 
Marxist government when they wrotei 
There is certainly no cause for hem- 
isphere alarm. ... To the panicmongers 
who predict that if Allende takes office 
"Severe Tests for Chile," "«■ York Times 
(September 9» 1970), p. *6. 
"A Marxist in Chile," Chicago Tribune (Sep- 
tember 9, 1970), p. 16. 
5 
Ibid. 
there will never be another free election 
in Chile,  he replies that there will be 
one in 1976,   and "if we have done badly, 
they will throw us out and elect someone 
else".    It would be folly to deny him his 
chance.6 
The editors of The Nation, in this same article, 
also criticized the "normally well-informed Wall Street 
Jojinal" for calling Dr. Allende something which he was 
not — "a Communist." In denying that Dr. Allende was 
a Communist, the editors of The Nation noted an assessment 
of the three candidates made by the British newsletter, 
Latin America! 
Allende was the most insistent in his calls 
for "Responsible attitudes and behavior". 
He opposes violence.   8 
Another response to the Allende victory came from 
Newsweek magazine.     The editors of Newsweek, pointed out 
that although Allende still had  to be approved by the 
Chilean Congress,  his chances for election looked very 
good.     This was because the third man in the race, Radomiro 
Tomic Romero of the Christian Democratic Party, would 
probably support Allende.    It was pointed out that on the 
day after the election, Tomic visited Allende«s home to 
congratulate him. 
 z  
"The Best Way for Chile, 
ber 21,   1970),  p.  228. 
Th« Nation    (Septem- 
8 
Ibid. 
Ibid.. 
The editors of Newaweek did feel, however, that a 
peaceful accession to power by Allende would have a deep 
impact on all of Latin America. 
In one  sense,  his inauguration would 
mark a triumph for the traditional, 
Moscow-style Communist Parties and a 
setback for the continent's Maoists* 
But whether that setback would prove 
anything more than momentary was open 
to question.    In any event, Chile under 
Allende would probably become a new base 
of operations for Latin American leftists 
of all stripes. 9 
Moreover,  this article noted that for the few days 
following Allende*s victory, Chileans "...  staged a 
mild run on the banks and drove up the black-market ex- 
change rate  for the escudo by seeking to convert their 
10 
savings into dollars."        The run on the banks reflected 
feelings of uncertainty about the new Allende government. 
Newsweek,  however,  was not  the only American news publi- 
cation to comment  on the action of Chilean investors to 
Allende's  election.    The editors of Time magazine also re- 
ported that  some Chileans panicked at the news of the 
election results.     In fact,  Time reported that the Santiago 
stock market closed for a day for the first time since 
p.  *r9. 
"A Marxist at the Top,"    Newsweek    (September 21,  1970), 
10 
Ibj£. 
1938, and that many " • • • depositors withdrew massive 
11 
funds from Chilean banks." 
Finally the Washington Post, in an editorial writ- 
ten several days after the election, praised Allende as an 
experienced and accomplished politician, " . . . brought 
up in Chile's democratic tradition and schooled in the 
12 
give and take of its legislature."   The editors of the 
Washington Post further noted that Allende's "... anti- 
establishment attitudes may come as much from being a 
Mason as from being a Marxist," and that "... those 
who respect him believe that he would stay within the 
13 
country's constitutionalist ambiance."   Thus it was the 
implication of these editors that, because of Allende's 
background, he would probably maintain Chile's democratic 
tradition and work for reform within the system. 
Another aspect of the Allende election which was 
commented upon by the American press concerned Allende's 
approval by the Congress. According to the Chilean Con- 
stitution, in a presidential election a candidate must 
receive a majority of the votes.  If a candidate has only 
a plurality (as Allende did) the congress then must decide 
11"The Making of a Precedent," Time (September 21, 1970), 
p. 34. 
1 2 
"A Marxist Wins in Chile," Washington Post  (Sep- 
tember 9» 1970), p. A-14. 
13 
Ibid. 
the winner.    Thus in October,  1970 the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies met to decide upon either Allende or 
Alessandri.    Traditionally,  the congress awarded the office 
to the candidate who led in the popular vote.    Allende'■ 
Popular Unity Front controlbd only 79 votes and therefore 
needed the 7** votes of the Christian Democrats to win. 
After mcuh discussion,  Frei,  the leader of the Christian 
Democratic Party,   "...  agreed to support Allende unan- 
imously in return for guarantees  that Allende would preserve 
Chile's cherished democratic traditions."        The final vote 
on the approval of Allende as reported to the New Yprk, 
Times,  wasi    Allende 153 votesi     Alessandri  35 votes; 
7 blank;   and  5 members absent. 
Once the Chilean Congress had given its approval of 
Allende,   many news sources in the United States immediately 
reacted.    The editors of the New York Times wrote that 
there was no way to deny Allende  the presidency,  and 
"...  the United States,  respecting this decision,  must 
make every reasonable effort to maintain good relations 
16 
with the Allende Government." In this same editorial, 
the to Ittft Time3 m°dified it8 position on Allende«s 
T^T •Victory and Violence,"    TJJBS    (November 2,   1970), 
p. 16. 
l5Joseph Novitski,   "Allende,  "igggjrt^JSt**! ,, 
Chile's President,"    &B Ilfl Times    (October 25.  1970).  p.   1. 
1-6"The Only Course for Chile."    New York. Times 
26, 1970), p. 36. (October 
10 
election. It will be remembered that in a pervious edit- 
orial, the Times called the Allende victory "... a heavy 
blow at liberal democracy."   After the Chilean Congress 
had given its approval of Allende, however, the editors of 
the Times wrote, "There are grounds for hope that democracy 
can survive in Chile.  One encouraging fact is that Chile's 
Socialist and Communist parties have long sought power only 
18 
by constitutional means. . . ."   Furthermore it must be 
remembered that Frei "... intends to maintain an active 
role of leadership, while his party still rettns claim to 
19 
being Chile's biggest Political Party."   Thus, the ed- 
itors of the New York Times expressed the expectation that 
the new government in Chile would respect and work within 
the Chilean constitution. 
In its assessment of the new Allende government, the 
U. S. News and World Report was much more conservative. 
Writing two weeks after Allende had been approved, the 
editors of this magazine wrote that the election of Allende 
will "... convert the country into another outpost of 
20 
Communism."   This article went on to emphasize things that 
17 
"Election of Allende,"    New York Times    (Sep- 
tember 6,   1970), p.  10. 
18 
"The Only Course for Chile,"    N«w York Times 
(October 26,  1970;, p.  36. 
19 
Ibid. 
20 
~ "With Chile Run by a Marxist, What U. S.  Can Expect," 
U.   S.  News ffliTfl  Wnrld Report.   (November 9,   1970),  pp.  20-21. 
11 
would seemingly alarm many Americans. One such alarming 
note was the implication that there would be strong ties 
between the governments of Chile and the Soviet Union due 
to Allende's victory and because of a warm congratulatory 
message sent by the Soviet Union to the new Chilean Pres- 
ident. A second alarming note for Americans was Allende's 
announced plans to nationalize Chile's basic mineral re- 
sources. According to this article, several large American 
companies had substantial investment interests in Chilean 
mineral production, and they stood to lose in nationaliza- 
21 
tion unless they received compensation. 
Two other news publications had comments concerning 
Allende's approval by the Chilean Congress. First the 
Washington Post, in an editorial, pointed out that Allende's 
Popular Unity Front in the congressional runoff controlled 
only 79 votes and needed the 7^ votes of the Christian 
Democrats for his election. The editors of the Washington 
Post then pointed out that the Front "... will require 
similar help to help implement the Allende legislative 
22 
program." 
Another reaction to Allende's approval came from 
gH N»w Raoublic.  In an editorial, this magazine examined 
21 
Ibid. 
22 
"The New Prospect in Chile,' 
(October 26,   1970), p.  A-22. 
waphinston p9g^ 
12 
the reaction of the Nixon administration to Allende's confir- 
mation by the Chilean congress. Interestingly, the Nixon 
administration sent no congratulatory message.  In fact, ac- 
cording to this editorial the following sequence of events 
occurredi 
With no forewarning to the State Depart- 
ment* a very high official of the White 
House, in an anonymous "background briefing" 
for reporters who traveled to Chicago with 
President Nixon on September 16, expressed 
his "great dismay" that a "Communist" had 
been elected against the will of 2/3 of 
Chile, and his conviction that if Allende 
took power, there might never again be 
free elections in that country.  Nor did 
the White House stop there. It put for- 
ward a new Latin-styled domino theory, ac- 
cording to which Peru, Bolivia, and Argen- 
tina (the latter now under a rightist 
military dictatorship which has suspended 
elections and yet enjoys normal relations 
with the United States; might be the next 
three countries to fall. 23 
In the material examined, no other American news publication 
made any reference to this White House briefing. 
Finally, Newsweek magazine called Allende's approval 
by the Chilean Congress "... the most significant polit- 
ical development in Latin America since Fidel Castro marched 
triumphantly into Havana more than a decade ago."   The 
editors of Newsweek in this same article went on to describe 
Allende*s plans for agrarian reform, urban development, and 
23"Chile and the 0. S.," Thft N». Republic  (No- 
vember 7, 1970), pp. 9-10. 
2 "Center Stage for Chile's Marxist President," 
Newsweek (November 2, 1970), p. 52. 
13 
nationalization. The editors felt, however, that "Allende's 
brand of Chilean socialism may turn out to be an inappro- 
25 
priate model for change in South America."   Traditionally, 
warned the editors of Newsweek, the readiness of Latin 
armies to step in and stop reform was a factor with which 
Allende might have to face.  This military force might be 
conservative or it might be politically left-wing. 
Still another aspect of Allende'a election concerned 
the position of the United States toward these Chilean 
political affairs.  It is interesting to note that almost 
all of the news sources agreed on one point, that the 
United States must remain clear of Chile*a  internal devel- 
opments.  Wrote the Denver Post in an editorial' 
We (the United States) cannot deny 
the right of Chileans to self- 
determination. 26 
The editors of the N«w York Times agreedi 
All the U. S. can do in this sit- 
uation is to keep hands off, behave 
correctly and hope for the best. 
. . . Whatever troubles Chile may 
face would only be compounded by 
even the appearance of American 
interference. 27 
-2T 
Ibid. 
"Chile to Test U. S. Policies,' 
(September 10, 1970), P« 6. 
Denver Pog* 
27 
"Election of Allende,' 
(September 6, 1970), p. 10. 
Nfr York Times 
1* 
Allende himself,  confirmed these opinions in an interview 
shortly after his election.     "In essence we want to be an 
economically independent country with the right to choose 
our own path.    We are believers in self-determination of 
28 
the people,  and in nonintervention." 
Finally,   the editors of the Washington Post expres- 
sed surprise at the conduct of the United States in the 
Allende campaign,  as opposed to the presidential election 
in 1964.     In 1964,   the United States bent over backward to 
help Eduardo Prei, whereas in this election the United 
29 
States had remained detached and proper. 
The American press also attempted to answer the 
question of why Allende was elected.    The editors of the 
Chicago Tribune called Allende's victory the result of 
"... his personal popularity and his  33 years on the 
30 
local political scene." Although Allende»■ experience 
and popularity probably contributed significantly to his 
victory,  one must not overlook the role of Radomiro Toraic. 
It was the opinion of the editors of the New York Times 
that Tomic,   the candidate of the Christian Democratic 
Party "...  tried at times to outflank Dr. Allende on 
the left and   .   .   .   seemed to be running against his own 
2B"Chile to Test U.  S.  Policies,"    Denver Pggt 
(September 10,  1970), p.  6. 
29"Election of Allende,"    New York Um?    (Septem- 
ber 9,   &70),  P*   !•• 
"A Marxist in Chile,"    gMfiflW Trjbyme    (Septem- 
ber 9,   1970),  p.   16. 
15 
31 
party's record in office."   The result was that Tomic 
lost some support within his own party, and finished 
third in the election. 
Moreover, the editors of the New Yorlc Times noted 
that although the Christian Democratic Party and Dr. Prei 
had "... achieved solid results over six years . • . ," 
Prei's government did not "... satisfy the expectations 
32 
it had aroused."   This then also contributed to the poor 
showing of Tomic and the Christian Democrats. 
Pinally, the editors of the Washington Post felt 
that the Allende victory was in part due to his experience 
in politics.  In addition, Allende was able to convince 
enough Chileans that he would not "... abuse the presi- 
dency to curtail the free system that elected him. ..." 
In conclusion, it can be said the American Press 
reacted both favorably and unfavorably to the new Marxist 
President in Chile.  American news sources such as the 
Chicago Tribune and U. S. News and World Report generally 
regarded the results of the election as a victory for the 
Communists around the world.  Neither of these sources 
expected the Allende government to last for the six-year 
term to which it was elected. 
"Election of Allende," N«?r Y»rk Times  (Sep- 
tember 6, 1970), p. 10. 
32 
Ibid., p. 10. 
33"A Marxist Wins in Chile," Washington Pos^ 
(September 9, 1970). P» A-lfc. 
16 
More favorable reaction to the Allende government 
came from the New ItfiE tlMIi Denver Post, and The Nation. 
These sources expressed the belief that Allende, from all 
indications, would work within the framework of the Chilean 
constitution. Time and Newsweek magazines generally re- 
frained from editorial!ting on the Allende election. In- 
stead they tended to report on the reaction of Chileans to 
the Allende triumph. It can be said, however, there was a 
general consensus among the major American news sources 
that Allende*s victory was due in a large part to his 
political experience and popularity. 
17 
CHAPTER  III 
NATIONALIZATION AND THE ECONOMY 
After the election and congressional  approval of 
Salvador Allende,  the newly elected government began im- 
plementing plans to nationalize  several industries.    It 
was reported in several American news publications that 
as  early as November,   1971.  Allende began nationalization. 
It was Allende's feeling that government control over 
certain industries was essential for a successful economy. 
His first steps  toward nationalization employed  a 
19^5 labor law,  which permitted government intervention 
to keep plants from closing.    Allende brought about a "tem- 
porary"  takeover of a hardware manufacturing industry partly 
owned by Northern Indiana Brass and then intervened in a 
feed company that was a subsidiary of Ralston Purina. 
In the copper mining industry, Chile's most val- 
uable resource,  Allende  felt that he needed additional 
legislation to insure nationalization.    As a result in 
late December,   1970,  Allende proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would make it possible for the president  to 
nationalize the country's mining industry.       Under 
3 "Chile Starts Chasing the Capitalists,"    Time. 
(January ^,   1971)» P»  68. 
18 
former President Eduardo Prei, the government, in a legis- 
lative act, was given 51 per cent share in the copper 
mines "... with options to buy the remaining ^9 per 
35 
cent."   To buy these shares, however, these options had 
to be paid in cash in some cases and not in long-term 
government bonds. Moreover, if the mineowners objected, 
this could not be accomplished. Under the new Allende 
amendment all such stipulations would be erased. Under 
this amendment, "... the government could act uni- 
laterally and compensation would be whatever Allende chose." 
On the local economic scene, Time reported the wild- 
cat strikes appeared in many parts of Chile, while 
"... squatters seized ^,250 new apartments in Santiago 
37 
alone." 
Several of these nationalization steps were discussed 
in other American news publications, too. For example, 
Newsweek magazine reported in February, 1971» that the 
plans for the legal expropriation of the land had run into 
difficulties. It seemed that, "on farm after farm peasants 
have seized the land, forcing owners off their property at 
38 
gunpoint." 
36 
35 
36" 
Ibid. 
37 
Ibid. 
38 
Ibid. 
"Land Grab," Newsweek (February 1, 1971). P- 37. 
19 
Newsweek pointed out that the government had "... made 
no effort to turn the peasants off the 200 farms they have il- 
39 
legally seized."   When fighting broke out between farmers 
and peasants, the government did not interfere, and often it 
was the owners who were arrested and jailed. President 
Allende "... pleaded with the peasants to wait for the 
legal expropriation of the land . . .," but they ignored 
40 
his pleas. 
In February, 1971, Time magazine continued to report 
on Allende's nationalization steps and the actions of his 
more radical supporters.  It was reported that groups of 
leftists had illegally seized almost 5.000 houses and apart- 
ment units "... and driven owners off some 750,000 
4l 
acres of farm land."   The editors also noted that Allende*s 
government had already "legally" expropriated almost two 
million acres. Allende asked that Congress "... pass a 
law making violent seizures of property a crime punishable 
by up to three years in prison. But his government has 
done little or nothing to enforce laws already on the books; 
in fact, it has ordered police not to use force in evicting 
kz 
the squatters." 
p. 36, 
39 
4o 
Ibid., p. 37. 
41 
Ibid., p. 37. 
"Allende«s Hundred Days,"  Time  (February 22, 1971). 
42 
Ibid., p. 36. 
20 
In this same article, Time reported that a Senate 
committee had given its approval to Allende*s mining 
amendment.    This was of particular interest to the Ameri- 
can mining firms  (Anaconda.  Kennecott and Cerro)  who claimed 
investments totaling over $1 billion.    Time said  that it 
was unlikely that the Chilean governments would  "...  set 
the sum anywhere near that high." 
Despite his problems with nationalization, Allende 
seemed to be popular with the Chilean working class.    It 
was pointed out by the editors of Time that Allende in 
an effort to help the poor and to fulfill a campaign prom- 
ise,   distributed  5.230 tons of powdered milk to Chilean 
children under fifteen years of age.    Moreover,   Allende 
ordered  500,000 pairs of shoes for free distribution to 
rural school children.     In fact, reported Time,  he even 
refused to have his portrait hung in government buildings, 
in order to budget "... the savings to rural health 
44 
programs."        Despite such measures, noted Time.,   inflation 
had risen from 6.4 per cent in November,  to 9 per cent in 
February.    Even more disturbing for Allende, was the fact 
that the world copper price was down to 48* per pound,  a 
drop of 40* in four months. 
"43 
44" 
Ibid., p.   36. 
Ibid., p.   36. 
21 
In the spring of 1971. Congress was still consid- 
ering Allende's copper nationalization amendment. Time 
magazine reported that, "Allende has already nationalized 
the coal, steel and nitrate industries, as well as two 
of the largest textile plants and 60%  of the nation's 
banking." 
Chilean businessmen were experiencing rough times. 
On one hand price controls kept their prices down, while 
on the other, the government demanded more taxes, and em- 
ployees sought higher wages. Allende had already "... 
granted cost-of-living increases ranging from 34.9# for 
46 
public employees to k"?%  for private workers."   Moreover, 
noted the editors of Time, by increasing the supply of money 
55 • 2 per cent in 1970, and 34.7 per cent in the first 
quarter of 1971. inflation would continue to rise. Ad- 
ditional economic problems were reflected in the following 
statistics" Chile's foreign reserves were $332 million in 
December, and by April they were down to $255 millionj 
"... the Chilean escudo has slipped to an exchange rate 
of more than 40 to the dollar on the black market (versus 
47 
14.5 at the official rateb"   and finally copper production 
was reported down 20# from the previous year. 
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Reporting on Chilean nationalization and on the 
Chilean economy the editors of U. S. News and World Report 
summarized Allende's major economic accomplishments. They 
noted the followingi  l) nationalization of eight major 
banks which control nearly 3/4 of the total national credit, 
2) redistribution of 380 expropriated farms, 3) stabilization 
of all prices " ... on all consumer goods and on rents, 
and the subsidization of low rates on electric power and 
public transportation.", 4) approval of wage boosts of 
thirty five to sixty per cent, and 5) expropriation of 
business firms in other key industries.  The latter had 
begun with the takeover of three textile firms and, late 
in March, the Government purchased an iron-mining subsidiary 
49 
of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 
According to the editors of 0. S. News and World Re- 
port, Allende was able to accomplish most of these actions 
without confronting the Chilean Congress.  For example, in 
the textile industry, Allende employed "an old law allowing 
Government intervention in companies operating to the det- 
50 
riment of the nation."   It seemed that the textile in- 
dustries, experiencing a slow down, were forced to lay off 
workers and defer tax payments. The government, however, 
interpreted such conduct as "detrimental to the nation" 
and took them. 
9"Can Marxists Now Go All the Way in Chile?"  U^S^. 
Newa and World Report  (April 19. 1971). P* 39. 
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In the banking takeovers, Allende created a 
"... state run development corporation that is author- 
51 
ized to buy stock in private companies. ..."   This 
development agency was able to buy enough stock to control 
eight banks. 
Not everything, however, was going along smoothly. 
The editors of U. S. News and World Report further noted 
that unemployment by the spring of 1971 had reached an all 
time high of 300,000 out of a total work force of 3 million. 
Five months earlier when Allende had taken over, it had 
only been 180,000.  In addition, foreign investors were 
rarely ever seen in Chile anymore and food shortages were 
becoming increasingly more common. 
On October 11, 1971, Allende announced that his gov- 
ernment would not pay for the three copper mines it had re- 
cently nationalized.  The Anaconda Corporation estimated the 
loss at $400 million while Kennecott stood to lose about 
$63 million. According to Allende the two copper companies 
owed the government $7^4 million in excess profits earned 
in the past fifteen years.  "Since that was far more than 
the $467 million book value of the mines, on which compen- 
sation for the takeover would have been computed and since 
no appeal was permitted, the game was over."   Both 
51 
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Anaconda and Kennecott protested Allende's mathematics, but 
to no avail.  The editors of Newsweek noted that, unless cop- 
per production increased and stability returned to the econ- 
omy, "... Allende seemed to be on a collision course with 
53 
economic calamity." 
The editors of U. S. News and World Report also com- 
mented on the condition of the Chilean economy in October, 
1971.  It was pointed out that the Allende government had 
taken over 1,300 large farms and that most banks were in 
Government hands.  On the surface there appeared to be pros- 
perity.  Sales were up in many shops and businesses. Ac- 
tually, the "miniboom," according to these editors, was due 
to price freezes while average wages jumped 30 per cent. 
In addition, the government "... to keep a heavy flow of 
imports" drew on foreign-exchange reserves.   Allende then 
had "... succeeded in buying time. . . ."   Complaints 
over land reform and food shortages were becoming more fre- 
quent.  Copper production, essential to the Chilean economy 
was expected to reach 1.2 million tons that year, but would 
probably total only 870,000 tons.  The editors of U. S. News 
and World Report concluded•  "Unless it (socialism in Chile) 
53 
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can be improved, Chile could wind up as broke as that 
56 
Socialist republic to the north — Castro's Cuba." 
By November, 1971, Salvador Allende had been in 
office one year. Jeff Radford, writing in The Nation, 
reported on Allende*s significant accomplishments during 
this period. Allende's program of nationalization was 
proceeding rapidly. The government had control over 85 per 
cent of the copper production, 100 per cent of steel, ce- 
ment, nitrate, petroleum, and coal production; 70 per cent 
of textiles, 25 per cent of all fishing industries and 
large electronic firmsj and almost 90 per cent of all 
57 
banking credits.   According to Radford, " . . . these 
state conquests . . • were carried out without sacrificing 
at least the trappings of democratic process and with a 
58 
minimum of violent reaction."   In fact, argued Radford, 
Allende "... could persuasively claim that no other 
regime in Latin America, at least during the past fifty 
years, has accomplished so much so quickly and still al- 
lowed the degree of freedom of expression currently enjoyed 
59 
in Chile." '  Radford also noted that the purchasing power 
of the average worker was up — a fact which can be in part 
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contributed to wage hikes to workers in some cases as high 
as 66 per cent.  This author concluded that Allende, "... 
seems to be proving that nonviolent revolution is possible* 
as long as the majority opposition party shares the same 
60 
general goal and can be persuaded to play along." 
Newsweek magazine, however, did not feel that Allende's 
program was as successful as some claimed. The editors of 
Newsweek acknowledged that Chilean workers were being paid 
substantially more and that this had caused a minor boom 
in the economy.  But this boom, stated Newsweek, would soon 
bankrupt the country. Looking closely at the Chilean econ- 
omy, dollar reserves had dropped from $335 million in No- 
vember, 1970, to $100 million one year later.  Food imports 
would more than double in this year to $300 million.  Chile's 
copper mines continued to lag in production, and the world 
market price of copper had dropped from 68* a pound to 
about k9<t  a pound.  As a result Chile's copper exports were 
6l 
down 23 per cent from 1970. 
Furthermore, foreign businesses and banks had refused 
any additional credit to Chile.  In November, 1971. Chile's 
foreign debt was $2.2 billiont half of this was owed to the 
62 
United States. 
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Time magazine agreed with the editors of Newsweek 
that the Chilean prosperity would be short lived unless 
something was done quickly. Time acknowledged the emer- 
gence of new buying powers among Chile's working class, 
and in addition noted a slow down in Chilean inflation 
(14 per cent in 1971 versus 35 per cent in 1970),  But, 
argued the editors of Tfrme. doubling the money supply and 
increasing foreign debts is no way to insure long-term 
economic security. 
Another American news publication to comment on the 
Chilean economic situation was Commonweal. Donald D. Ranstead 
writing for this magazine summarized rather effectively the 
Chilean problem as told by one of Chile's leading economists, 
Anibal Pinto. 
It EChilel is a small country with 
copper its one basic dollar-earning 
export.  It has had a stagnant agri- 
cultural sector unable to feed its 
rising population for over 25 years. 
The domestic market is too small to 
absorb much locally produced durable 
goods. ...  The chronic inflation 
adds yet more variables.  Inflation 
is the main factor making for a ramp- 
ant consumer psychology in all classes 
but especially the middle and upper. o«» 
63«You're Going Great. Chicho." TJjifi (Novem- 
ber 15. 1971).  V-  37. 
^Donald D. Ranstead. "Chile con Allende," COJJ- 
monweal  (December 10, 1971). P- 253* 
28 
As a result of an economy such as this, only 16 
per cent of the gross national product was saved annually* 
President Allende on November k,  1971. called for a 19 per 
cent rate.  If a country drops its reliance on foreign 
loans as Chile had done, then according to Pinto, a country 
must save 25 per cent of its national product H . ■ • if a 
65 
minimum 5 per cent growth rate is to be sustained."   Thus, 
as far as this economist was concerned, Chile was in trouble. 
Not everyone was in agreement, however.  Ranstead also 
pointed to some interesting statistics that supposedly re- 
flected the cost of livingi 
The opposition contends that the cost- 
of-living rise this year is running at 
30 per cent whereas the government (as 
have all previous governments) relies 
on the official cost of living index 
which ways 18 per cent.  It depends on 
how you look at it.  Often items on the 
index are not available but only a sim- 
ilar product at twice the price, etc. 
The Sociedad de Fomento (the Chilean 
Association of Manufacturers) charge 
that the year will end with a deficit 
in the balance of payments of some »^io 
million) the Banco Central says $150 
million. The same business groups ar- 
gue that the dollar reserves will be at 
an all time low of $100 million the end 
of the year and that imports wil have to 
be cut drastically next year (especially 
food imports which will run to $240 mil- 
lion this year).  The President simply 
ignores these Cassandras and points to 
the fact that unemployment is down to 
-5T 
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5 per cent and that in the 1st nine 
months of 1971. . . •  50,000 new 
housing units went up. The PDC 
(Christian Democratic Party) says, 
yes, but only because the State 
incurred an 11 billion escudo def- 
icit in its 1971 budget (Jk  per cent 
of the whole.) 66 
As a result it appeared that there was some dis- 
agreement over the interpretation of the economic statistics 
coming out of Chile.  In any event, it can be said that 
Chile's economy having incurred large debts would be in for 
rough times unless some changes were made. 
In December, 1971* Time magazine reported that over 
5,000 Chilean women demonstrated in Santiago to publicize 
Chile's food shortages.  According to the editors of Time, 
the demonstration known as the "March of the empty pots" 
was organized by the Christian Democrat and National parties. 
The march was organized to coincide with the departure of 
visiting Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. 
Chilean women dressed in simple cotton 
prints, minis and sleek pantsuits headed 
for downtown Santiago, snarling traffic 
and filling the spring evening air with 
the sounds of banging pans, partiotic songs 
and chants of "Chile, si I  Cuba, noil" 67 
The protesting soon developed into a full scale 
riot, as young extremists suddenly appeared and began 
66Ibid. 
67"Empty Pots and  Yankee Plots,"    Time.    (December 13, 
1971).  p.  26. 
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fighting right-wing youths. After several hours and many 
arrests the situation was brought under control.  The rea- 
son for the demonstration was that Chilean agricultural 
production had plummeted in the preceding months.  Beef, 
reported Time, was available only one week out of four. 
Eggs, poultry and other staples were often sold the same 
morning they appeared on the market shelves.  Moreover, 
to compensate for the growing shortages, the Chilean gov- 
68 
eminent had to greatly increase food imports.   A sec- 
ond reason for this demonstration was to embarrass Allende 
before his Marxist guest and before the world. 
Newsweek magazine also reported on the "March of the 
empty pots." Their report was consistent with Tjjne. maga- 
zine except that Newsweek reported over 15,000 Chilean 
women participating as opposed to Tine's 5,000. Newgweeft 
also called the march "... the biggest and most violent 
demonstration against the Allende government since it took 
69 
office in Novmeber, 1970." 
During the early months of 1972, Allende*s government 
continued the program of nationalization. The United States 
government, in response to this, announced a policy change. 
On January 19, 1972, President Richard Nixon warned that if 
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a country does not provide adequate compensation for United 
States' property taken over by that government, the offending 
country can expect to have all aid cut off. In addition, 
the United States would use its voting powers in the Inter- 
American Development Bank and the World Bank to stop aid to 
that country.  The editors of The New Republic pointed out 
that under the Hickenlooper Amendment the President already 
had the power to stop aid if a foreign nation seized United 
States owned property. It was further noted, however, that 
Nixon regarded the Hickenlooper Amendment as ineffective, 
70 
and thus he felt that a stronger warning was needed. 
Henceforth, the United States government began a policy of 
restricting aid to Chile because of the continuing policy of 
nationalization—often without compensation—in that country. 
In spite of this United States warning, by July, 1972, 
sixteen United States companies had some or all of their 
71 
property nationalized.   According to the editors of U±S_!. 
News and World Report. Allende was moving too quickly toward 
a Marxist state. Wage boosts had brought on increased 
spending which in turn resulted in widespread shortages of 
many staple goods. 
70 
"Tough Talk," BU NPW Republic (February 5. 
1972), p. 9. 
?1Anaconda, Cerro, Kennecott Copper. Je™le*£*Steel, 
Armco Steel, Northern Indiana Brass, Ford Motors, Bank of 
America, First National City Bank, ^§1°-^**™ JJii*?eSor-e, 
Du Pont, ITT's telephone subsidiary, Parsons and wmttemore, 
RCA, Ralston Purina, Coca-Cola Bottling 
32 
The emergence of the Chilean black market can be 
attributed  to this situation.    Many farmers  and ranchers 
were selling their produce door to door,  as opposed to 
72 
taking their goods to market. 
In addition,   the Allende government,  in expropriating 
about 2,600 large farms,  had run into  trouble administering 
the cooperatives.    Disputes between co-op farm workers and 
landless peasants became commonplace.    Dissatisfaction also 
was growing over shortages of credit desperately needed for 
73 
seed  and  fertilizer. 
Inflation continued to run rampant.    Prom January to 
June,   1972,   the cost of living jumped by 25 per cent,  as 
compared  to  a 23 per cent increase for all of 1971*    As a 
result,  President Allende announced in June,   1972,  the econom- 
ics minister,  Pedro Vuskovic,  "chief architect of the program 
to transform this country into  a Socialist state," would be 
7k 
dismissed. Additional plans for nationalization would be 
slowed as  "...  to restore some measure of investor confi- 
75 dence." It was  the opinion of the editors of U.  S. News 
and World Report,   that such action indicated 
the Marxist experiment  is floundering badly.' 
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Business Week, took a harder line on the economic 
conditions in Chile. The editors of Business Week, in 
August, 1972, wrote that Allende's Chile was on " . . . the 
77 
brink of economic disaster."   The editors continued 1 
The country's two prime economic 
sectors, mining and agriculture, are 
a shambles.  Its hard currency reserves 
and its international credit-worthiness 
are virtually nonexistent. And infla- 
tion is rampaging at a 50# annual rate.78 
The editors of Business Week also reported on Al- 
lende's nationalization program (see Appendix). Interest- 
ingly, most foreign companies emerged from the nationalizing 
process in relatively good shape. With the exception of 
Anaconda, Kennecott, and ITT, "... most foreign companies 
were paid from 60# to 100# of book value" for their nation- 
79 
alized property.   By comparison, a domestic company rarely 
received kO  per cent and wealthy land owners "... get from 
1# to 10# of their land's tax valuation in cash, with the 
rest in government paper that inflation is rapidly rendering 
80 
worthless." 
In addition, the editors of BmAMil Week noted tne 
continued decline in Chile's currency reserves.  In November, 
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1970, Chile's reserves amounted to $483 million, but by 
August, 1972, this figure had dropped to $25 million. 
Allende, however, was still implementing his socialistic 
plans of "soaking the wealthy." A 100# tax was added in 
July on automobiles, and telephone companies raised their 
rates 20# in working class districts, and 100# in upper 
81 
income areas. 
In the spring and early summer of 1972, several 
American news sources reported that Allende was beginning 
to lose his grip on the political situation.  Newsweek. 
for example, noted that Allende had found himself caught 
between Socialists in his party calling for "... an 
acceleration of the revolutionary process . . ."and more 
conservative Moscow-oriented Communists who wanted the 
government to slow down in its policy of nationalization 
and "... consolidate its hold over the huge chunks of 
private land and industry already seized during the past 
nineteen months." *" The disagreement, according to Newsweek,, 
was due to continuing economic problems.  Inflation went 
unchecked, as the consumer price index showed that prices 
jumped almost 25 per cent in the first five months of 1972. 
Moreover, noted the editors of Newsweek,, copper production 
had slumped badly, and farm output continued to plummet. 
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Time magazine also describes Allende's problems during 
this period.  In February, the Chilean Congress passed a bill 
which made nationalization of private firms subject to con- 
gressional approval.  This legislation was proposed by the 
Christian Democratic and National parties. In April, 1972, 
" . . . Allende angrily vetoed the bill and threatened to 
84 
dissolve the entire Congress."   This threat only weak- 
ened Allende's position as two cabinet members of the Inde- 
pendent Radical Party—who had supported Allende—quit, and 
the party withdrew its support from Allende's Popular Unity 
Coalition. 
The editors of Time also reported on the worsening 
economic conditions which included increased shortages of 
meat and vegetables.  Allende instead had been encouraging 
Chileans to eat more rabbit and fish. Furthermore, illegal 
land grabs, mostly by the MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary 
Left), "... have continued at the rate of between 60 and 
85 
100 per month." 
In another article, the editors of liae magazine 
again examined the worsening economic conditions  in Chile. 
Contrary to Allende's claims th* the United States was 
"  .   .   .  deliberately restricting Chile's lines of credit  .   .   . 
the editors of Time magazine reported that the "   .   .   .  gov- 
ernment's freewheeling spending to provide across-the-board 
■&T 
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salary increases and promote public works schemes . . . have 
eaten up more than $300 million in currency reserves in 
86 
the 21 months since Allende came to power."   Furthermore, 
with the printing of more money, "... the official ex- 
change rate has jumped from 12.5 to k2  escudos to the dol- 
lar while the black-market rate has risen from almost 28 
87 
to 175«"   Production remained low, as foreign technicians 
continued to leave the country, thus driving productivity 
even lower. To combat all of this, Allende announced a 
"work, sacrifice and savings program," which according to 
Time was "... a mix of populist palliatives and sensible 
88 
economic reforms."   Two significant points of his new 
program included $400 million in promised loans from Com- 
munist countries and the formation of "supply and price 
committees in local neighborhoods to help fight inflation." 
In the fall of 1972, the American press characterized 
the economic situation in Chile as going from bad to worse. 
It was so bad, in fact, that President Allende himself saidi 
90 
"We are on the verge of civil war. . . ."   According to 
the editors of Newsweek, this crisis began when the govern- 
ment proposed "... to set up a state trucking firm in 
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the isolated southern city of Aysen."   Immediately all 
the truckers walked off their jobs fearing nationalization 
of the entire industry.  Allende declared a state of emer- 
gency in 21 of 25 provinces and placed then under military 
control.  This action was then followed by the arrest of 
several truckers. 
Newsweek also reported that many Chilean shopkeepers 
and office workers went on strike in sympathy with the 
striking truckers. Within a few days doctors, lawyers, and 
other professionals including supervisors in Chile's copper 
industry joined in. Allende, deciding to yield for the 
present, released the truckers' leaders from jail. The 
editors of Newsweek pointed out that recent demonstrations 
included many peasants and workers.  This will mean that 
"... Allende will have to scramble to maintain his coal- 
itions* present near-majority in next spring's congressional 
92 
elections." 
Another American news publication which described 
the trucker's strike was Time magazine. In addition to 
describing the events in Aysen and in Santiago, the editors 
of Tiaft noted the bad timing of the strike.  Inflation had 
reached "... a staggering 99-8 per cent."   Some prices 
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even exceeded this ratei  sirloin steak, when available, 
increased 100 per cent in price i  stew beef was up 116 per 
cent, and powdered milk up 166 per cent.  Shortages were 
reported in wheat, bread, and butter. 
Time reported that Allende faced even more difficult 
times ahead.  A bus owners' strike in Santiago immediately 
following the truckers' strike, virtually paralyzed San- 
tiago for days. 
Chile's grave economic situation also received 
attention from the editors of U. S. News and World Report. 
According to this source, Allende in a national broadcast 
called the October, 1972, crisis, "the gravest in our nation 
95 
in recent years."   Faced with rising inflation and striking 
workers, Allende was now being attacked in the courts of 
Holland and France, where the Kennecott Corporation, still 
angry over their losses in Chile, attempted to block ship- 
ments of Chilean copper.  Kennecott claimed that the Chilean 
copper was, in effect, stolen property. As a result the 
editors of ii. s. News and World Report concludedi 
The odds, after days of rumblings in 
Chile in October (1972) were that 
President Allende probably would weather 
the current crisis—but the next one 
would be tougher still. 9& 
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Allende,  after surviving the October truckers'   strike, 
turned his attention to obtaining economic aid from foreign 
sources.    Allende began a five-nation tour early in December, 
1972,  scheduling visits to Mexico,  the United States,  Algeria, 
the Soviet Union,   and Cuba.     Newsweek magazine noted that 
Moscow had provided Chile with $293 million in aid  in the last 
two years,  and trade between the two countries soared  to 
$7.7 million in 1971,  "...   as compared with $2 million 
97 
during the entire period from 1964 through 1970." More- 
over,  the Chileans had received a guarantee  from the Russians 
that  they (the Russians)  would  "...  buy 130,000  tons of 
Chilean copper and $87 million worth of copper products  over 
98 
the next  three years."        Allende, however,  sought additional 
financial guarantees.    It was  the opinion of the editors of 
Newsweek that the Russians would be unable to make such guar- 
antees because of their own financial woes.    Furthermore,  the 
unstable economic  situation in Chile (inflation was  expected 
to reach 160 per cent that year, with an expected trade def- 
icit  of $430 million,  and food  imports exceeding $700 million) 
did  not warrent additional investment.     "They  (the Russians) 
are wary.    They don't want to get their^fingers burned as 
they have elsewhere  in Latin America." 
97 Aid and Comfort," Newsweek.  (December 11, 1972), 
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While visiting the United States,   President Allende 
delivered  an address  at the United Nations.    He criticized 
several American corporations for making excess profits at 
the  expense of Chileans.    Allende  singled out the Kennecott 
Corporation which he  said made an average annual profit 
from 1955 to 1970 of almost  53 per cent on its  investment. 
In this same speech Allende appealed for economic aid.    The 
editors of The Nation pointed  out that Allende*s credit 
lines, which were $219 million in August of 1970,  had  slipped 
to $32 million two years later.    Added to  this was a drop 
in the world market price of copper which cost Chile about 
$187 million during the same period.    One  could readily 
understand  some of Chile's problems. 
The editors of Th« Nation were  sharply critical,  both 
of the poor reception Allende received when arriving in the 
United  States,  and of the American response to Allende«s 
speech.    First,  in regard to Allende's arrival,   the editors 
of The Nation wrote ■ 
Decent manners are never a Ji*JiJi2l   *   '   * 
The contrast between Mexico's welcome 
and the treatment Allende received 
in our country is humiliating—not Q1 
to Allende but to  civilized Americans.1 
10°«Allende Strikes Back,"    The Nation    (December 18, 
1972),  p.  613. 
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The editors of The Nation then attacked the response 
of the Nixon administration to Allende*s speech at the 
United Nationsi 
Our Administration took no notice 
whatever of Allende, and in answering 
his General Assembly speech—after 
the ovation had died down—all George 
Bush (United States representative at 
the United Nations) could find to say 
was that foreign trade is not neces- 
sarily evil. Thus idiocy was added 
to incivility. 102 
In the days that followed, Allende, though warmly 
received in most countries, was still unable to obtain 
all of the funds which he felt were needed to help Chile. 
The economic situation in Chile in 1973 became in- 
creasingly worse.  By Pebruary, the government, because of 
numerous shortages, began distribution of all food, clothes, 
and consumer products.  Time magazine reported that because 
of shortages, Chileans were forced to stand in long lines 
to get such things as sugar, powdered milk, cooking oil, 
and cigarettes.  Allende, conceding that some of his eco- 
nomic plans were poorly prepared, criticized workers for 
their high wage demands and bureaucrats H ... for failing 
to improve government efficiency."    Allende even 
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threatened to ration beer in an effort to halt workers' 
wage demands.    Despite the threats by Allende, workers 
still persisted in their demands.  The editors of Time 
reported the following statistics on the Chilean economy! 
1) industrial production dropped 7 per cent in 1972, 
2) farm output was down 10 per cent in 1972, as compared 
to 1971*  3)  unemployment, because of public works pro- 
grams, decreased from 8.3 per cent at the end of 1971 to 
3 per cent in December, 1972, k)    a $600 million deficit 
105 
on a total spending of $1.4 billion. 
In the spring and summer of 1973#  Allende's economic 
problems continued to plague him.  In April, Joseph Benham 
writing in the U. S. News ajj World Report remarked that 
inflation was up 90 per cent in the first three months of 
1973.  Even more important, production was substantially 
down in mining, agriculture and manufacturing.^Finally. 
Chileans were experiencing widespread hunger.    In July, 
the editors of Time reported that inflation was an unbe- 
lievable 235 per cent. Various groups became increasingly 
more violent in attempts to demonstrate their feelings.  A 
group of leftist workers, for example, in early July seized 
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4 5 factories in Santiago's industrial belt in protest over 
the economy and in protest over the activities of right- 
wing groups.  In other parts of the country crippling strikes 
caused the economy to come to a virtual standstill. An at- 
107 
tempt was even made on the life of Allende. 
In August, strikes by the truckers, transportation 
workers and factory workers left Chile in a complete state 
of chaos, and to most observers it became only a matter of 
time before something would explode.  Shortly thereafter, in 
lieu of these mounting problems, a violent military coup 
erupted in Santiago, Chile, and the Allende regime ended. 
But with the end of the Allende government and the death of 
Salvador Allende, Chile's economic problems persisted.  Inev- 
itably, a new government again would grapple with the same 
economic problems that Allende had struggled with for three 
years. 
In conclusion it can be said that several American 
news publications, namely Time. NewgweeK. and U. S. News and 
World Report, gave to their readers a consistent weekly ac- 
count of the economic problems in Chile.  These accounts were 
usually supported with statistics, many of which have appeared 
in this paper. These sources further warned that increasing 
economic difficulties if unchecked would result in disaster. 
Other American publications such as Commonweal and Business 
Week gave similar assessments, though not as frequently. 
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According to these sources, Allende's program of na- 
tionalisation had run into problems, both at home and abroad. 
The Chilean Congress dominated by the opposition parties had 
refused to give Allende all the freedom he sought* Moreover* 
the United States had tried to make life as uncomfortable as 
possible for Allende and Chile because of the copper mine 
seizures.  Production in the copper mines, on the farms, and 
in the factories was down.  Shortages had become widespread 
and Allende's appeals to foreign sources for credit often 
went unanswered. 
Allende's program for agrarian reform never really 
materialized. Although many farms were taken over by the 
government, mismanagement and unplanned seizures by the MIR 
resulted in losses in production and popularity. 
In an attempt to check the soaring inflation, Allende 
raised the wages of workers and increased the money supply 
in circulation, while at the same time freezing many prices. 
These actions resulted in several "minibooms" for the economy 
but the long term effect was disastrous. Workers began de- 
manding additional wage increases and the government simply 
could not meet these demands as Allende's programs had con- 
sumed almost all of the available cash resources. 
The only American journalist to take exception to 
some of the above was Jeff Radford, writing the The Nation. 
In November, 1971, when Tiafi. M—*» and c°M>°nweal were 
reporting sizable drops in cash reserves, losses in productivity 
*5 
and  increasing foreign debts,  Radford praised the Allende 
government for its accomplishments and for preservation of 
the democratic  process* 
Some criticism was aimed at the American press for 
its reporting on the Allende regime.    John Pollock,  writing 
in The Nation,  discussed several omissions of the American 
press.    First,  noted Pollock,  reports on citizen reaction 
came  only from middle- or upper-class people who were pre- 
dominantly anti-Allende.    Second,  the American press rarely, 
if ever,  commented on right-wing groups.    Third,  and 
"... perhaps more flagrant than the others,  is the virtual 
absence of evidence suggesting that Allende has made any 
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social or economic progress whatsoever." Pollock,   using 
statistics from    Analvala of the Economy in 1971  published 
by Chile's Planning Office,  reported that under the first 
year of Allende agricultural production doubled,  the consumer 
price  index rose  slower than the  1970 increase,  construction 
was up 9 per cent,  and unemployment dropped almost 4 per cent. 
Pood production according to Pollock's  information also  in- 
creased in Chile in 1971•    M°re important according to Pol- 
lock was Chile's increase in its gross national product in 
1971,  of 8.5 per cent.    This was the second highest in Latin 
America, wrote Pollock.    "Our reporters have failed to record 
108John Pollock,    "What the Press Leaves Out,"    Tfce 
Nation    (January 29,  1973).  V  136. 
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such indicators of progress,  and have fairly consistently 
109 
labeled Chile's future as dismal and   'clouded'." 
Some of Pollock's criticism was  justified.     For ex- 
ample,   it was probably true that  the American press concen- 
trated more on reporting on the anti-Allende segment of the 
Chilean population.    It was further true that left-wing 
activities did receive more publicity.    Pollock's assertion, 
however,  that the American press did not present pro-Allende 
evidence showing economic progress,  is unfounded.     Both Time 
and Newsweek reported that much progress had been achieved 
in lowering inflation, raising wages, and in decreasing 
unemployment.    These news sources warned, and later events 
seemed to prove them correct, that Allende made too many 
concessions without examining their consequences. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE COUP 
On September 11, 1973» a violent military coup erupted 
in Santiago, Chile. According to Time magazine correspondent 
Charles Eisendrath, the following sequence of events occurred. 
Early Tuesday morning Allende arrived at the Presiden- 
tial Palace, La Moneda. Shortly thereafter, La Moneda was 
surrounded by at least 100 carabineros—Chile's paramilitary 
police.  General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, commander in chief 
of the army, telephoned the palace and promised Allende safe- 
conduct out of the country if Allende would surrender the 
presidency.  Refusal to comply, warned Pinochet, would re- 
sult in a violent overthrow of the government.  Allende re- 
sponded in a brief radio broadcast in which he said»  "I will 
not resign.  I will not do it.  I am ready to resist with 
whatever means, even at the cost of my life. . . • 
Soon the navy and the marines joined the coup.  Allende 
found himself in the palace with less than fifty of his own 
supporters, still refusing to surrender. Within moments 
the infantry launched a twenty-minute barrage against the 
palace. Then General Pinochet again called, restating his 
ultimatum.  But once more, Allende refused. 
110"Allende Toppled. Commits Suicide," Greensboro Dally 
News  (September 12, 1973). *•*• 
U8 
At noon Hawker Hunters of the Chilean air force crop- 
ped bombs, rockets, and tear gas on the palace.  Finally, 
the infantrymen were able to enter the palace about ninety 
minutes after the air attack.  It was then that Allende or- 
dered his personal bodyguards and presidential police to 
surrender, while he remained behind. Allende, still refusing 
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to surrender, committed suicide.     Thus the first demo- 
cratically elected Marxist leader in the Western Hemisphere, 
unable to solve his country's economic woes and unable to 
effectively quiet the mounting divisions among his own sup- 
porters, saw his vision of a Marxist Chile end. 
The American press immediately reacted to these vio- 
lent events in Chile. Some news sources expressed regret 
and sorrow at the fall of Allende and of democratic tra- 
ditions in Chile. The editors of the N«w York Times for ex- 
ample, called the military coup in Chile a tragedy. 
Any military coup is a tragedy. . . . 
It is especially tragic for Chile 
where sturdy democratic machinery 
had functioned for many years and 
the armed forces had a strong tra-   _ 
dition of keeping to their barracks. 
111«The Bloody End of a Marxist Dream," Time. 
fqMvi-..fc.f 7%    1071). DO. 35-37.  Although many American 
iSPSuLftiirSjAt^ Allende committed suicide, 
it has never been fully established. 
112»Tragedy in Chile," New YorK Tines (September 9, 
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Similarly,   the editors of the Washington Post wrote 
of the tragedy in the death of democracy in Chilei 
Chile's coup is different.     Its special 
tragedy is that it ends Latin America's 
longest democratic tradition and also 
its most serious effort to carry out 
rapid social change within a framework 
of representative government.   .   .   •1*3 
Another major newspaper in the United States,  the 
Denver Post,   concurred.    Writing about Allende's diminishing 
maneuverability between left and right-wing political forces, 
the editors of the Denver Post wrote» 
Nevertheless, Allende never abandoned 
his belief in the constitutional proc- 
ess?   the concept of government by legal 
means is deeply ingrained in Chile.    We 
are disheartened by the  failure of yet 
another elected government in our hemis- .^ 
pherei   to the South there are few remaining. 
Other news publications,  however,  found little to 
lament.    The  editors of the Ctfc.atro Tribune,  for example, 
felt that the "tragedy" had actually occurred three years 
earlier,   at the time of Allende's election.    They wrote 
that Allende had provided only lip service to democracy in 
a country in which 6& of the people voted against him. 
113"Coup in Chile,"    JMMJMfl— Post    (September 13. 
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A common reaction to the military 
takeover in Chile has been to lament 
the destruction of a democracy.    The 
lamentations come too late.    Violence 
was done to democracy in that country 
three years ago when the Marxist Sal- 
vador Allende assumed the presidency 
as the minority winner of an indecisive 
election.    Then, while giving lip ser- 
vice to democracy, he began wrenching 
Chile from Capitalism to Socialism on 
the pretext that he had a mandate to do 
so.    He had no such mandatei     63 per 
cent of the people had voted against 
him and what he stood for.   .   •   •   115 
U.  S.   News and World Report, on the other hand, 
neither regretted nor applauded the fall of Allende. 
Writing for the U. S.  News and World Report. Joseph Ben- 
ham examined instead three reasons why the overthrow of 
Allende was slow in coming.    Benham felt that first,   there 
was some reluctance on the part of the military to take 
over because they wanted to be sure H   .   .   .  they could win 
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without provoking a civil war." Second,  according to 
Benham, Chile had a long tradition of non-military rule 
which had lasted for almost 50 years.    Finally,  the military 
leaders in Chile "... hesitated to blow the whistle on 
Allende   ..." because they had no real ambitions about 
117 
governing. Benham's only comment on the coup itself was, 
ll5"The End of Allende,"    Q&Mm Tribune    (Septem- 
ber 13,   1973).   P« 2*. 
ll6Joseph Benham,   "New Challenge for Chile After a 
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"As coups d'etat go in Latin America, Chile's was a par- 
118 
ticularly violent one." 
It was common knowledge that the Allende government 
was in trouble.    Worsening economic conditions resulted in 
widespread rumors that the military was planning to take 
over.     Writing for the New York Times.  Israel Shenker sum- 
marized  the conditions in Santiago in the weeks preceding 
the coup.    Shenker reported that there were daily demon- 
strations both for and against Allende.     "The left saw a. 
right-wing conspiracy supported from abroad i     the right 
inveighed against a regime they thought was ruining the 
119 
country.H The military during this period crushed op- J 120 
position and controlled the disorders. 
The editors of Time magazine also acknowledged the 
existence of rumors coming out of Santiago that Chile was 
on the verge of a military coup in the summer of 1973* 
Chileans,  however,   according to the editorial of Time 
thought their country was immune from military takeover. 
As a result they paid little attention to these rumors. 
It can be said further that American news publi- 
cations did agree on one point concerning the overthrow of 
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the Allende government.    In every newspaper and weekly maga- 
zine examined, the basic cause for Allende's collapse was 
his determination to implement his plans for drastic change 
without ever having a mandate to do so.    What support Al- 
lende did have was further threatened by disputes among 
supporters within his own party. 
The Washington Post,  for example,  reflected these 
ideas in an editorial written two days after the coup. 
He ^Allende]    ignored the limitations 
of his minority support and attempted 
to govern as though he wielded a ma- 
jority.    He lost control of many of his 
own supporters.  I21 
The editors of the Now York Times writing the day 
after the coup shared this view.    Responsibility for the 
disaster can be in part blamed on all people and factions 
involved,  but "... a heavy share must be assigned to 
the unfortunate Dr. Allende himself." The editorial 
continuedi 
Even when the danger of polarization 
had become unmistakably evident, he 
persisted in pushing a program of 
pervasive socialism for which he had 
no popular mandate.    His governing 
coalition—especially his own Social- 
?srpar?y-pu?sued this goal by dubious 
121"Coup in Chile,"    WnnMMt9n PQ8*    (September 13. 
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means,  including attempts to by- 
pass both Congress and the 
courts.123 
The editors of Time magazine,  in summarazing the 
Allende collapse,  felt th8t "   .   .   . Allende made at least 
two crucial political mistakes." The first was 
"...   to  forget—or at least ignore—the fact that he 
125 
had entered office as a minority winner." According to 
Time,   "Allende*s second mistake was to assume that the mid- 
dle and  upper classes would placidly accept his   'Chilean 
road to socialism'   so long as all things were done consti- 
126 
tutionally.     They never did." The principal cause of 
Allende's downfall,  however, .  was his inability to 
settle a series of crippling strikes—staged not by leftist 
labor unions but by the President's implacable middle-class 
127 
enemies." 
Still other news sources in the United States reflec- 
ted  this same opinion-that Allende never had the support of 
a majority to complete his programs,   and this eventually 
caused his downfall.    The editors of Newsweek wrote. 
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Chile was simply not ready to suddenly 
make a peaceful transition to socialism 
—not because  there was something theo- 
retically impossible about the effort, 
but because Allende never had a popular 
majority on his side.  128 
Newsweek,  in this same article,  also noted the growing 
problems within Allende's own Unidad Popular coalition.    It 
was pointed out that many within this party wanted Allende 
to push harder for change, while others felt that more re- 
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strained measures should have been adopted. 
Further support for this "no mandate hypothesis" was 
found in an article by Lewis H. Diuguid in the Greensboro 
Daily News.    Diuguid first noted that "...  the basic 
cause for the crisis was Allende's determination to carry 
out his program of sweeping change without majority sup- 
port." '       Diuguid,  however, noted some additional factors 
in the Allende collapse.    One such factor was the unwill- 
ingness of the Christian Democrats to compromise toward the 
end of the Allende government.    A second factor concerned 
disagreements among administrators.    According to Diuguid, 
l28"The Brutal Death of an Idea, Can Marxism and 
Democracy Mx?"    Newsweek    (September 24,  1973).  p. <*• 
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policies were often weakened, changed or even discarded 
while moving from the cabinet level to implementation in 
the field.  Diuguid wrotei 
The government chain of command frayed 
into separate hierarchies layered through 
the ministries by the Communists, the 
Socialists, and Christian left.  None 
trusted the others. 131 
Thus, according to Diuguid, there were several fac- 
tors in addition to Allende's failure to gain popular sup- 
port that caused his government to collapse. 
The editors of the Greensboro Daily News also com- 
mented on the cause of Allende's final crisis. It was their 
feeling that Allende's programs often drove a wedge between 
his supporters and himself. 
His measures of expropriation and nation- 
alization were so aggressively pursued, 
with such chaotic and uncertain results, 
that even the parties theoretically allied 
to Allende turned against him. 132 
In the same editorial the editors of the Greensboro 
Daily News went on to say that they felt that Allende's 
radical structural changes were alien to the political 
temperament of the people, and that this in part caused 
131 
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Allende's appeal to slip.    Moreover, Allende's primary de- 
fect M   .   .   . was a blind faith in 19th Century Marxism." 
This was both impractical and impossible to implement. 
A final aspect of the Allende government that was 
discussed in the American press concerned Allende's legacy. 
Lewis H. Diuguid,  in the Washington Post, wrote that Allende 
had given to many within the working class a feeling of 
participation.    Allende's greatest impact, however, was his 
concentration of economic power in the government.    An ex- 
ample of this was Allende's program of nationalizing American 
copper interests.    This celebrated acquisition "... came 
through legislation passed unanimously by the opposition- 
controlled Congress." 
A second important impact of the Allende government 
was "...  rapid application of an agrarian reform law 
passed by the Christian Democrats in 1967,  under then Presi- 
135 
dent Eduardo Frei." The Allende government,  according to 
Diuguid,  applied this "...  law to acquire virtually every 
136 
farm larger than 200 acres." Unfortunately for Allende, 
redistribution and development of this land never materialized 
because of financial and political problems. 
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In conclusion, Diuguid felt that additional change 
did not come because of opposition in Congress to Allende 
but because the Popular Unity Coalition never agreed among 
themselves. 
A New York Times editorial agreed with one aspect of 
Diuguid's analysis"  the Allende government gave many workers 
and peasants a " . . . sense of national participation • • •»" 
137 
which was something they had never had before.    The edit- 
ors of this newspaper also noted that Allende had "... sub- 
stantially improved the lot of Chileans on the lowest rungs 
of the economic ladder," but that these gains probably could 
"... have been achieved at far less overall cost and with- 
138 
out the disastrous polarization of Chilean society."    In 
summary, the editors of the N*w York Times felt that the 
military takeover was not a reaction against Allende's pro- 
grams, but rather an attempt to avert civil war. 
An American writer to take a similar position was 
E. Bradford Bums writing In ?h« Nation. Burns noted that 
it was the peasants and working class who saw increases in 
their buying power despite the runaway inflation. 
Their children drank milk daily for 
the first timei their consumption of 
meat increased! consumer items such as 
13?"The Chilean Tragedy," New York, Times (Septem- 
ber 16, 1973). P« !*• 
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bicycles,   radios,  television sets,  and 
stoves, long thought a luxury, became 
commonplace in working class homes* 
The government turned shanties and 
shacks into decent housing by empha- 
sizing construction and giving pref- 
erence to building for the poor. 
While a crisis mounted in middle-class 
housing, the less privileged were 
living better than ever before.  **• 
Thus for these benefits, Allende was able to enjoy 
the support of the working class, and the working class 
"... identified with their President and for the first 
time felt themselves part of the governing process." 
Another American writer to comment on Allende's leg- 
acy and on the implications of Allende*s death was William 
Parkinson.     Parkinson, writing for the Chicago Tribune   felt 
Allende's suicide would "... have a neutralizing effect 
on opposition to the new regime." Had Allende been exe- 
cuted by the new regime, he would have instantly "...  be- 
come a martyr to the cause of Marxism throughout the hemis- 
phere.   ..." If Allende would have lived,   either 
imprisoned or in exile,  "... he would have remained a 
potential contender for the nation's leadership,  however 
E.   Bradford Bums,  "True Verdict on Allende,      Tfce. 
Nation    (October 29.  1973). P» **23- 
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distant." Thus,  as a result of the circumstances of 
Allende's death,  the new regime did not have to face a 
revengeful opposition. 
The editors of the U. S. News and World Report also 
commented on the meaning of Allende's death and on the fall 
of Chile's Marxist Government.    It was their feeling that 
the collapse of the Marxist government was a substantial 
setback for Russia's ambitions in Latin America.    Also,  the 
United States would probably have an easier time in seeking 
investment opportunities in Chile under the new military 
government.    In view of Allende's program of nationalization 
any change from that policy would be welcomed by investors 
in the United States.    Last, the immediate loser,   according 
to this article, was Fidel Castro.    Castro had contributed 
much to Allende in an effort "... to enhance his image 
throughout Latin America." Allende's defeat,   then,  was 
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a defeat for Castro too. 
To E. Bradford Burns, however, the Allende government 
«... offered reform as the viable alternative to revolu- 
tion."^7    All of Latin America had their eyes on Chile to 
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see if this could be accomplished, but when the Chilean 
military, together with "... the frightened middle and 
upper classes, proved that at least on this occasion it 
could not, the depressing conclusion that one might draw 
from this sad lesson is that in Latin America change by 
reform is impossible. . . . Democracy, freedom and reform 
in Latin America suffered a staggering blow on September 11, 
in Chile. The repercussions will be felt throughout the 
148 
next generation." 
Finally, in complete contrast to the Burns article, 
the editors of the cpio.*™  Tribune discussed the end of 
Allende. The editors of this newspaper felt that Allende 
might have done his country a great service in dying if 
Chile returns to its democratic system. 
If he committed suicide, as the junta 
said he did and as he previously had 
said he would under these circumstances, 
then he did the generals a favor, he 
deprived his supporters of a figure 
around which to rally. « th^11^rJ
enS 
the return of democracy to a country 
which has cherished it, Dr. Allend* +Ar 
will have rendered his country a greater 
service in death than he did as presi-  l4o 
deS during the last three unhappy years. 
American news publications also attempted to answer 
the question how might Allende have survived.  The editors 
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of the New York Times wrote that Allende's survival was 
dependent upon his willingness to offer continued cooperation 
with the opposition Christian Democrats, Chile's largest 
political party.    When in September,   1973» Allende refused 
to compromise with Prei and the Christian Democrats,  the 
150 
situation became explosive. 
Moreover,   in another New York Times editorial,  it 
was pointed out that if Allende "... had    moved more 
deliberately;   if he had paused for consolidation after nation- 
alizing Chile's basic industries and had delineated reasonable 
boundaries for his socialist program,  he probably would have 
completed his term with a considerable measure of success." 
John MacLean, writing in the Chicago Tribune,   also 
discussed  the question of Allende's survival.    MacLean pointed 
to a May 1973 meeting between Allende and United States 
Secretary of State, William P. Rogers.    Allende, reported 
MacLean,   asked for economic aid, but the United States, well 
aware of Allende»■ problems,  refused to supply any help.    As 
a result, MacLean raised the question^ whether the United 
States could have bailed out Allende. 
"Tragedy in Chile,"    W«w York. Times,     (Septem- 
ber 12..1973). P* ^6' m. ,.     . I5I-The Chilean Tragedy."    Nfl* York, ^mes     (Septem- 
ber 16,   1973). P»  **• _  .,   , 
152r v    «.nT«n    "Could U. S. Have Bailed Out Chile's 
62 
In summary, it can be said that the economic and 
political problems of Salvador Allende received attention 
in the American press.    References to labor strikes, 
political violence, and administrative disagreements were 
reported frequently.    As for the coup itself, American news 
sources generally agreed that the basic cause was Allende*s 
failure to have a majority of Chileans supporting his pro- 
grams.     Reaction to the coup, however, was varied.    Some 
news sources felt that Allende's death was a tragedy, while 
one maintained that Chile was better off without him. 
Allende left behind a country in economic turmoil. 
Reform programs had not yielded substantial results,  and 
Chilean society was experiencing class polarization.     Sev- 
eral news sources agreed that Allende had given the peasants 
and the working class a feeling of participation.    The same 
sources noted,  however,   that the programs of nationalization 
and agrarian reform were not as successful as had been hoped. 
Thus,   it can be expected that the military junta which suc- 
ceeded Allende will face a rough road ahead. 
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CHAPTER V 
EPILOGUE 
In compiling information for this study,   it was 
observed that certain American news publications consist- 
ently supported  the Allende regime while others consist- 
ently criticized Allende and his policies.    This consistency 
of sentiment can be traced back to the time of Allende's 
election,   through the period of economic turmoil,  and con- 
cluding with the coup. 
Examples of anti-Allende sentiment were observed in 
several publications.    The thoughts of the editors of U.   S. 
News and World Report were one such example.    One editorial 
immediately labeled the new Chile government in November, 
1970,   as "   .   •   •   another outpost of Communism." Through- 
out the next two years all reporting on Chile from this 
periodical reflected almost an anti-Chilean attitude inlhe 
sense that the editors frequently expressed feelings of no 
faith in Allende*s government.    By October,   1971.   for example 
the editors warned that Allende's programs had only 
"...   succeeded in buying time   ..." and that soon c*ile15^ 
would be facing similar economic problems as Castro's Cuba. 
l53"With Chile Run by a Marxist, What U. S. Can Expect," 
n.   ,.   M       "^J^eoU     (November 9.   1970).   pp.  20-21. 
l5*"The Road to Socialism,     A Rough On. Por Chile." 
U.  S. News an* gflgU Bl*U3    (October 25.   1971).  P- T3* 
6k 
Additional warnings of gloom soon followed.  In July, 1972, 
the editors concluded that Chile's M . . . Marxist experi- 
155 
ment is floundering badly."    In October, 1972, with Allende 
faced with rising prices and striking workers, the editors 
of the U. S. News and World Report observed that Allende may 
"... weather the current crisis—but the next one would 
156 
be tougher still." 
At the time of Allende*s demise when other news publi- 
cations spoke of the tragedy of his death, Joseph Benham of 
the U. S. News and World Report examined instead reasons why 
157 
the coup was slow in coming.    Finding little to lament, 
the editors saw Allende's collapse as a setback for Russia's 
ambitions in Latin America, and a possible victory for Ameri- 
cans who may be seeking future investment opportunities in 
Chile. 
The r.^Tcayo Tribune also reflected this anti-Allende 
feeling.  The editors of the Triune were skeptical from the 
outset of Allende's chances of converting Chile into a 
Marxist economic state. When Allende's programs failed and 
the coup erupted, the editors of the Tribune did not praise 
Allende nor were they saddened over the coup.  Instead, they 
155 u. s. "Slowdown on the Road to Marxism in Chile.' 
News and World Report  (July 10, 1972). p. 53- 
156«It's a Rocky Road for file's Marxists." UM 
gg, g| j^M R«port   (0ctober 3°' 1972)' p* 53* 
1^7.        .   n    .   _    »M-W Challenge for Chile After a 
1973). P-  W. 
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reminded the reader that almost two-thirds of the people 
had voted against Allende and his plans. As a result, 
Allende had no mandate to change Chile into a socialist 
state.  Thus, it was the destruction of the Chilean democ- 
racy that deserved the lamentations, not Allende. 
One news publication that consistently supported 
Allende was The Nation.  In an editorial shortly after 
Allende*s election, the editors of The Nation urged that 
Allende should be given his chance.  In November, 1971, 
while some news publications were reporting difficult times 
for the Marxist government, Jeff Radford of The Nation re- 
ported economic progress. Later, in December, 1972, the 
editors of The Nation in a very pro-Allende editorial, 
criticized the American government for its reception of 
Allende at the United Nations. In yet another pro-Allende 
article, John Pollock reported several omissions of the 
American pressi the most flagrant of which was "... the 
virtual absence of evidence suggesting that Allende has 
158 
made any social or economic progress whatsoever."    After 
the coup, E. Bradford Burns reported the many gains the 
peasants and working class obtained. More importantly Burns 
emphasized that it was these people who " . • . for the first 
time felt themselves part of the governing process." 
158John Pollock, "What the Press Leaves Out." Tfce 
Nation (January 29. 1973). P* 136- 
159E. Bradford Burns. "True Verdict on Allende." The. 
Nation  (October 29, 1973). P* 42> 
■ 
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It was further observed that the Washington Post and 
Denver Post were both sympathetic toward the Allende govern- 
ment.    This was particularly evident at the time of the coup. 
The editors of the Washington Post called the coup a tragedy 
in that it ended "... Latin America's longest democratic 
tradition and also its most serious effort to carry out 
rapid social change within a framework of representative 
160 
government." Similarly the editors of the Denver Post 
wrote they too were saddened at the failure of the consti- 
tutional government in Chile. 
One news source that was not consistent in its opin- 
ion of the Allende government was the New York Times.    It 
was noted that the editors of the Times called Allende*s 
victory at the polls "...  a heavy blow at liberal democ- 
161 
racy." One month later, when Allende received congres- 
sional approval,  the Times wrote•     "There are grounds for hope 
162 
that democracy can survive in Chile." During the difficult 
period preceding the coup, the New York. Tjmeg frequently 
editorialized on the Chilean situation.    Many of these edit- 
orials,  however, did not specifically deal with nationalization 
and the Chilean economy.    Instead, most of these editorials 
T6"o" 
'Coup in Chile,"    WaahjngtC (September 13» " oup : 
1973). P-  A-l*. 
1    "Election of Allende."    New York. Tltte,g    (Septem- 
ber 6,  1970),  p. 10. 
"The Only Course for Chile,"    flg York Times 
(October 26,   1970),  p.   36* 
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dealt with either United States-Chile relations,  the ITT 
affair,   cabinet changes,  or local elections.    When the 
editors of the Times did address themselves to the problems 
of the economy,  they implied that Allende was not to blame. 
In reviewing the nationalized copper mines,  a Times editorial 
concludedi 
Leaders of his own Socialist party 
and their Communist allies have in- 
sisted for months that Chile should 
pay no compensation for the Anaconda 
and Kennecott copper properties.    In 
this, as in other matters, Dr.  Allende 
may have been swept along by forces he 
could not control.   *®3 
In the only N»w York Times editorial that dealt 
directly with the economy,  the editors in August,  1972, 
summarized the particular problems and then compared Chile's 
transition to socialism with that of Cuba's. 
If President Allende were candid, he 
would admit that economic distress 
is an invariable accompaiment of the 
convulsions required to Socialize an 
economy.     Chile is merely repeating 
man? features of Cuba;s unhappy initr- 
ation into the Socialist "Utopia    little 
more than a decade ago. *»* 
When Chile was «  •   •   • I** *■ "■ *orst Political 
and economic crisis  since Salvador Allende's Marxist- 
^^gency in Santiago,"    NejOo^Ti^    (August 25, 
1972),  p.   32. 
1     "Confiscation in Chile,"    NfW Yor* H»M    ^~ 
ober 2,   1971).  P*  30. 
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dominated Popular Unity* Coalition came to power  .   .   .",  the 
editors of the Times urged Allende to "   .   .   .  stand up to 
the extremists  in his camp, relax the repression and revive 
political dialogue with Christian Democrats and other 
165 
democratic forces." 
Finally,  the editors of the Times,  in reviewing the 
coup in Chile,   called the end of Allende a tragedy.    This 
of course, was quite different from the editorial that ap- 
peared following Allende's election in September,  1970. 
Among the magazines surveyed,   the most precise and 
consistent reports of the entire Chilean situation came 
from Time and Newsweek.    These weekly summaries provided 
thorough accounts of Allende»s election,  his nagging eco- 
nomic problems,   and his demise.     No other American magazine 
gave Chile such complete coverage. 
It was observed that the American press appeared to 
give ample attention to the important events in Chile dur- 
ing the Allende regime.    It further appeared that these re- 
ports factually coincided but differed mainly in interpre- 
tation. 
^"Confrontation in Chile."    New York, nmes 
(October 16,   1972), P« **. 
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Production under gov- 
ernment control. 
Indus-try 1222. 
per cent 
Agriculture 
Autos 
Foreign Banking 
Chilean Banking 
Electrical 
Fishing 
L. P. G. 
Coal Mining 
Copper Mining 
Iron Ore Mining 
Nitrate Mining 
Petrochemicals 
Steel 
Telephone 
Textiles 
Tires 
Ik 26 
0 27 
0 99 
56 99 
0 75 
5* 77 
0 5k 
17 9k 
^6 85 
Ik 100 
51 100 
30 65 
52 100 
0 100 
0 85 
0 100 
"The Chaos in Allende Country,"    JjynlTWM U* 
(August 12,   1972),  p.  k6. 
